Mississippi College School of Law

MC Law Digital Commons
Journal Articles

Faculty Publications

2004

The Precautionary Principle as the Law of Planetary Defense:
Achieving the Mandate to Defend the Earth Against Asteroid and
Comet Impacts While There is Still Time
Evan R. Seamone
Mississippi College School of Law, eseamone@law.harvard.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/faculty-journals
Part of the Air and Space Law Commons

Recommended Citation
17 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2004).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at MC Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of MC Law Digital Commons.
For more information, please contact walter@mc.edu.

ARTICLES
The Precautionary Principle as the Law of
Planetary Defense: Achieving the Mandate to
Defend the Earth Against Asteroid and Comet
Impacts While There is Still Time
EVAN R. SEAMONE*
CONTENTS

I.
II.
III.

IV.

V.

VI.

Introduction ...........................................
The Precautionary Principle .....
............................
A. Specific Recommendations ..............................
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/ HSPD-5 ...............
A. Applicable Solutions for Planetary Defense ..................
B. Questions that Remain Unanswered in the New Policies ........
Government Liability ....
.................................
A. Unintended Deflection onto Another Country .................
B. Inadequate Protective Measures ...........................

2
6
11
12
14
15
16
17
17

C.
Governmental Inaction .................................
Lessons From Public Health .................................
A.
The Problem of Labeling ................................

18
19
19

B. Agency Over-Involvement ..............................
Concluding Remarks ......................................

21
22

Current legal and policy efforts to enable adequate defense against potential
asteroid or comet collisions with the earth are insufficient because they are
indirectly premised upon theories that require verification of a clear and imminent threat before governmental agencies can act. This Article identifies the
"precautionary principle" as the preeminent law of planetary defense against
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government agency, including the Judge Advocate General's Corps and the United States Army. This Article
reflects a presentation delivered by the author at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA)
Political and Policy Implications Session of the 2004 Planetary Defense Conference: Protecting the Earth from
Asteroids (Orange County, California, Feb. 26, 2004). The author would like to thank Matthew Watters for his
valuable insights.
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asteroid and comet impacts. The precautionary principle requires governments to
take action to prevent harm even when it is uncertain if, when, or where the harm
will occur. It requires governments to implement specific frameworks for making
prompt decisions, directs intergovernmental bodies to plan for the "worst case
scenario," and requires planners to develop self-reinforcing standards by scheduling continuing simulations and updates to their technical guidelines. If governments institute these measures and then fail in their efforts to protect earth
populations, the principle shields agencies from liability with "Good Samaritan"
immunity. Finally, the precautionary principle mandates that governments coordinate the roles of all the different agencies that could foreseeably become involved
in planetary protection in advance of any actual threat. The development of the
Initial National Response Plan by the Department of Homeland Security and the
experience of governments responding to public health issues offer further
guidance to planetary defenders.
I. INTRODUCTION

Although the topic of asteroids and comets striking the earth (natural impact)
has caused innumerable skeptics to roll their eyes condescendingly,' the public
came very close to knowing the horror of an impending asteroid disaster
first-hand on January 13, 2004. On the very day before President George W. Bush
was expected to deliver a speech on the new American space policy, asteroid
threat detection experts contemplated issuing a warning that an asteroid named
2004 AS 1 could collide with the Earth within 36 hours.2 Unlike other recent
"near misses," this one prompted agencies like the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) to consider their limitations in responding to a
short-notice asteroid threat and their subsequent responsibility to notify more
capable operational agencies. 3 For the first time, scientists were forced to answer
the difficult questions that they had previously entertained only as brainteasers:
* which agencies are responsible for planetary defense;
* what options do they have in mounting an effective defense;
* how do they determine unacceptable consequences in their selection of
methods to prevent utter chaos;

1. CARL SAGAN, PALE BLUE DOT: A VISION OF THE HUMAN FUTURE IN SPACE 262 (1994) ("On first hearing
about the Asteroid Hazard, many people think of it as a kind of Chicken Little fable... The tendency is to
dismiss the prospect of any catastrophe we have not personally witnessed."); Martin E.B. France, Planetary

Defense: Eliminating the Giggle Factor, AIR & SPACE POWER CHRON., 1 (Aug. 7, 2000), available at

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/france2.html (describing the skepticism professionals display when addressing their responsibilities in relation to this unique space threat).
2. David Whitehouse, Earth Almost Put on Impact Alert, BBC NEWS (Feb. 24, 2004), available at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/I/hi/sci/tech/3517319.stm.
3. Id. at 3 ("Many astronomers recognize that a false alarm could have brought ridicule on their profession.
They are calling for more planning and less panic if it should happen for real next time.").
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* who has the final say; and
* what guarantees that nations will
cooperate in defensive measures rather than
4
taking a unilateral approach?
For a brief time while decision-makers confirmed the nature of the threat posed
by 2004 AS1, the total lack of answers to these questions indicated to the
scientific community the importance of clarifying such "rules of the road" as
quickly as possible. Fortunately, the threat posed by 2004 AS 1 never materialized.
Even before the 2004 AS 1 incident, space policymakers were beginning to
recognize the need for mitigation measures. 5 While no living person has
experienced the horror of a massive asteroid or comet strike, the inherent threats
from space debris and deorbiting space stations have independently alerted
governments of their need to plan for such dangers. While developing threat
response programs to address the falls of Skylab in 1979 and the Mir Space
Station in 2001, various agencies considered several different collision scenarios
and concluded that no amount of planning fully contain all potential threats. 6
Without question, asteroids and comets are distinct from falling space stations
or space debris because they are far less predictable and pose much greater harm.
First, the lack of a coordinated series of telescopes across the globe makes it
impossible for astronomers to monitor all potential asteroid and comet threats.7
As a result, some policymakers have wagered that novice sky watchers will be
just as likely as professional astronomers to spot the next significant asteroid or

4. Cf Brigadier General Simon P. Worden, Deputy Director for Operations of U.S. Space Command,
Military Perspectives on the Near-Earth Object (NEO) Threat (Jul. 10, 2002) available at http:/
www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=8834 (raising similar concerns).
5. They agreed some action was necessary to prevent harm even though they could not define precisely what
was meant by the term "mitigation." See U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, International
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/819 (Dec. 3, 2003), at 3, item 4
(recognizing "the growing international recognition that public safety officials need to consider [natural impact]
and to develop jointly appropriate measures fora variety of impact scenarios"); An Open Letter to the Australian
Federal Government from International Scientists (Jan. 28, 2002), availableat http://wwwl.tpgi.com.au/users/
tps-seti/pr ozsg.htm (urging international collaboration due to the serious nature of the threat); REPORT OF THE
FORCE ON POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS NEAR EARTH OBJECTS (U.K., Sept. 2000) [hereinafter U.K.
TASKFORCE REPORT] (developing national policies due to the potential for harm from natural impacts); Ames
Space Sci. Div., NASA, Spaceguard Survey Report available at http://impact.arc.nasa.gov/reports/spaceguard/
index.html (discussing policies of the United States).
6. Compare NASA Skylab Reentry: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations
House of Representatives, 96th Cong. 178 (1979) [hereinafter SKYLAB HEARINGS], with R.J. McKinnon & M.T.
Sullivan, Mir Emergency Management: National Arrangementsfor Managing the Public Safety Aspects of the
Re-Entry of the Russian Mir Space Station, 16 AusTL. J. EMERGENCY MGMT. 36, 36 (2001).
7. E.g., Andrea Carusi, Present and Future of the Spaceguard Survey, in JAPAN SPACEGUARD ASSOCIATION,
TASK

INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON COLLABORATION AND COORDINATION AMONG NEO OBSERVERS AND ORBITAL

COMPUTERS 59, 61, 64 (Syuzo Isobe & Yoshifusa Asakura eds., Oct. 23-26, 2001) (observing the "problem" that
confirmation of asteroid or comet threats requires "a great number of observing stations [be] continuously
operational" and the dearth of observation points in Europe and the Southern hemisphere).
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comet threat.8 In addition to inadequate monitoring capabilities, some threats,
such as long period comets, may emerge so quickly that they will evade even the
best telescopes altogether or until it is too late to respond. 9
Second, unlike Skylab or the Mir Space Station, the collision of even a smaller
range asteroid can cause damage similar to the detonation of a nuclear bomb.' °
While scaremongers or filmmakers may dwell entirely on horrific predictions of
significant damage, it is evident to even the most objective scientist that victims
of an asteroid or comet impact face severe consequences. Impacts in the oceans
will endanger coastal regions with tsunamis; direct impacts with land could result
in a host of problems, like earthquakes in proximate regions, individuals losing
their hearing from the sound of the strike, and poisoning of the atmosphere."'
Based on predicted harm to earth populations, statistical analyses of the
likelihood of another significant impact, and continuing discovery of large
asteroid craters across the globe, international policymakers have concluded that
a real threat will require international cooperation, and that decisions made in the
near-term may have consequences for many generations to come.12 Ultimately,
governments can increase the chances of limiting or eliminating threats to an
impact zone by detecting such threats long before the impact is due. With enough
time to mount defensive measures from a space station or from earth, governments will be able to deflect or destroy the oncoming object. However, even if
time is limited or affirmative defensive measures fail, agencies can secure life
and property by effectively preparing local governments and their citizens to
evacuate and survive under the difficult and undesirable conditions.
In light of recent unexpected crises including the international outbreak of
Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), widespread blackouts affecting
Canada and the United States, and continued terrorist activities across the globe,
planners are beginning to recognize the public's increasing vulnerability to

8. See House Committee on Science, available at http://www.house.gov/science/press/107/107-286.htm
(describing H.R. 5303, the Charles "Pete" Conrad Astronomy Awards Act, which "establishes awards to
encourage amateur astronomers to discover and track asteroids crossing in a near-earth orbit").
9. Alan W. Harris, Can We Defend Earth Against Impacts by Comets and Small Asteroids?, MERCURY,
Nov./Dec. 1996, at 12 (describing criticisms of existing programs that cannot track certain types of asteroid or
comet threats).
10. See Michael B. Gerrard & Anna W. Barber, Asteroids and Comets: U.S. and InternationalLaw and the
Lowest-Probability,Highest Consequence Risk, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 4, 7 (1997).
11. E.g., Duncan Steel, Project Spaceguard: Will Humankind Go the Way of the Dinosaurs?,24 IRISH AsTR_
J. 19, 21 (1997) (describing such events).
12. Report of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
Vienna, July 19-30, 1999, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 184/6, Resolution 1.1.c.ii (calling for countries "[t]o improve the
international coordination of activities related to near-Earth objects" on many levels); Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development Global Science Forum, Workshop on Near Earth Objects: Risks,
Policies, and Actions 3, at Conclusion I (Jan. 20-22, 2003), availableat http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/40/
2503992.pdf; U.K. TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 33, Recommendation 9 ("There is an obvious need for
some international forum of discussion of the scientific aspects of the problem. There is an equally obvious need
for a forum of intergovernmental action.").
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unpredictable threats. Perhaps the greatest stride in planning has been the
Department of Homeland Security's development of the National Response Plan,
which is designed to consolidate various threat-specific policies into a single
all-hazards plan to deal with sudden onset harm. 13 Natural impact falls within this
scope of unpredictable harm because planners suffer from a lack of experience
deflecting and destroying threatening space objects. "
In the context of planetary defense, proclamations that nations and local
governments must cooperate accomplish nothing of substance. Such gestures are,
in fact, not much different from the concerns historically voiced by experts in
relation to all space threats. In the 1960s, legal scholars attacked the vague
principles regarding cooperation and concern for future generations on the basis
that these policies contributed to a "legal vacuum" in space, devoid of practical
guidance.1 5 The greatest problem then, and now, is that well-intentioned principles impair the ability of governments to address foreseeable danger because
these vague principles create a false sense that important inroads have been
forged. 16 Despite the provisions of the existing Outer Space Treaty, and several
United Nations policies and proclamations, none of these documents provided
clear direction to the international community regarding responsibilities to deal
with the fall of Skylab.' 7 The historical push for greater, more meaningful,
regulation of space harm provides a working definition for true progress in
planetary defense: "detailed administration," opposed to "the language of agreement,"' 18 coupled with "methods for reaching specific decisions in particular
19
cases."'

This Article addresses four legal and policy aspects of planning for sizeable
asteroid and comet threats. Part II explains specific measures required by the

precautionary principle. The purpose of this Part is to provide the general
theoretical basis underlying governmental obligations to take certain actions to
prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural impact threats.

13. See infra Part III.
14. United Nations, supra note 5, at 2, item 2:
In designing a rational response to this potential threat, policy and decision makers are hampered by
the currently very incomplete state of knowledge of the number, sizes, orbits and physical properties
of near-Earth objects, such as asteroids and comets. Equally counterproductive is the almost complete
lack of defined governmental responsibilities for addressing the issue of near-Earth objects, even at
the national level, and the complete lack of coordination of policies at the international level;
SAGAN,

supra note 1, at 251-57 (discussing a multitude of specific unknown factors).

15. WILLIAM A. HYMAN, MAGNA CARTA OF SPACE 27,43 (1966).

16. Id. at 43.
17. SKYLAB HEARINGS, supra note 6 (investigating several unanswered questions about countries' responsibilities the deal with the harm threatened).
18. Maxwell Cohen, Introduction: Law and Politics in Space, in LAW AND POLITICS IN OUTER SPACE 11, 16
(Maxwell Cohen ed., 1963) [hereinafter SPACE POLITICS].
19. Oscar Schachter, The Prospectsfor a Regime in Outer Space and InternationalOrganization,in SPACE
POLITICS, supra note 18, at 95, 99.
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Part III applies Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 to the threat
of asteroid and comet impact. HSPD-5 is crucial to planetary defense because it
reveals that the U.S. Government recognizes an obligation to act preventively
against all potentially serious, national-level threats. While the document is still
being revised, it must inevitably deal with the problem of natural impact and, as a
result, represents a significant stride in space disaster mitigation.
Part IV considers the potential liability that governments face for inaction or
accidents encountered during deployment of defensive measures. It emphasizes
that the need to take preventive action is entirely separate from the issue of how
governmental agencies should conduct themselves in an operational sense. While
nations have an inherent right to self-defense under the United Nations Charter,2 °
they cannot defend themselves with any and all possible means. Operational
considerations such as necessity and the use of proportional force provide
guidance. 2' Considerations of governmental liability will assist agencies responding to natural impact in a similar way by providing additional considerations
while the agencies act on their obligation to mount defensive measures.
Finally, Part V shares helpful lessons in organization and collaboration gleaned
from public health, especially in the area of infectious disease law and policy at
domestic and international levels. These final considerations emphasize that
some problems are so common to all crises that their successful resolution in one
context will assist governments in another context, even when, as in this case, it is
difficult to appreciate even the possibility of natural impact devastation. All the
considerations addressed by this Article apply equally to any asteroid or comet
threat regardless of the amount of time existing before an impact is due, including
threats that manifest with no notice at all.
II.

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

The precautionary principle governs responses to unknown types of harm. In
many international agreements and other bodies of rules, the principle obligates
governments to institute measures to prevent potential harm from a source, even
if it is not certain if, when, or where, the harm will occur.2 The current policy of

20. U.N. Charter art. 51.
21. Dawn R. Eflein, A Case Study of Rules of Engagement in Joint Operations:The Air Force Shootdown of
Army Helicopters in OperationProvide Comfort, 44 A.F.L. REV. 33, 40 (1998) (reviewing military precedents)
("Necessity is the requirement that force be used in response to a hostile act or in situations in which the hostile
intent is evident . . . 'Proportionality' means that the amount of force used in response to a threat must be of
reasonable intensity, duration, and magnitude to counter the threat.").
22. The original document expressing the precautionary principle is from the German policy on pollution. It
is called the Vorsorgeprinzip, and states, "Environmental policy is not fully accomplished by warding off
imminent hazards and the elimination of damage which has occurred. Precautionary environmental policy
requires furthermore that natural resources are protected and demands on them be made with care." Konrad von
Moltke, The Vorsorgeprinzip in West German Environmental Policy, reprinted in ROYAL COMM. ON ENVTL.
POLLUTION, TWELFTH REPORT: BEST PRACTICAL ENVIRONMENTAL OPTION 57, 58 (1988). Since the articulation of

2004]

PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN PLANETARY DEFENSE

the United States requiring agencies to prevent terrorist attacks before they occur
rests squarely within this principle. Mitigation measures contained in this policy
depend on preventive and anticipatory action: "[t]he greater the threat, the greater
the risk of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory
action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to time andplace of the
enemy's attack."23 In the context of planetary defense, the same principle applies
because some natural impact threats can strike without notice (e.g., long-period
comets). Likewise, in hypothesized situations where asteroids are spotted with
some advance notice, response times may require so much preparation that
delaying action will preclude effective intervention.
In line with the precautionary principle, lawmakers and planners should be
cautious of adopting different alternatives to deal with asteroid and comet threats
that are projected to occur within different timeframes.24 While some priorities
must change over time, such as evacuating people in impact zones closer to the
time of impact, governments must be capable of responding to threats of the
greatest magnitude at all times. Planning for a "worst case scenario" is common
in disaster relief circles. Whether the harm is an earthquake, flood, or other
natural disaster, the government's goal must be to withstand maximum harm; not
only harm that is considered "normal. 2 5 The logic underlying this practice
recognizes that there may only be one chance to avert significant harm. Multiple

this directive, countless international agreements have adopted the same language in contexts ranging from
climate change to protection of waterways. A commonly cited example is the convention dealing with the Baltic
Sea: "The Contracting Parties shall apply the precautionary principle, i.e., to take preventative measures when
there is a reason to assume that substances or energy ... may create hazards ... even when there is no
conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between inputs and their alleged effects." Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, (Apr. 9, 1992), Art. 3 (2) available at
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/22los.txt. For a more detailed discussion, see Evan R. Seamone, The Duty to
"Expect the Unexpected": Mitigating Extreme Natural Threats to the Global Commons Such as Asteroid and
Comet Impacts with the Earth, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735, 761 n.144 (2003) (listing international
agreements and their specific language).
23. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 5 (Sept. 2002), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/secstrat.htm (emphasis added).
24. In a recent conference sponsored by the American Institute of Astronautics and Aeronautics, the
facilitators requested that experts consider three different hypothetical asteroid and comet threats. These threats
would occur in six years, twelve years, and twenty-nine years, raising the issue of how agency responses should
change in relation to the amount of notice available to disaster response personnel. David K. Lynch & Glenn E.
Peterson, Athos, Porthos and Aramis: Three PlanningScenariosfor PlanetaryProtection (unpublished paper:
AIAA 2003), at 1.
25. In other words, if you are prepared for the worst, you must also be prepared for anything less severe.
Evan R. Seamone, When Wishing on a Star Just Won't Do: The Legal Basisfor InternationalCooperation in the
MitigationofAsteroid Impacts and Similar TransboundaryDisasters, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1113 n. 106 (2002)
(describing the "spill-over" benefits of all-hazards planning). One applied example of this is the concept of the
probable maximum flood, which guides planners in preparing for flash floods. JOHN B. MILLER, FLOODS: PEOPLE
AT RISK, STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTION 17-19 (United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1997). While
statistical analyses of past trends would call for minimal efforts, planners anticipate the worst possible flood in
the measures they institute as an added precaution in populated areas. Id. at 17 (noting circumstances when
"some estimate of the greatest flood that could occur at a particular site is often sought").
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plans for every imaginable scenario could lead to mass confusion.26
The consequence of the precautionary principle on policy is the adoption of
"effectiveness as international law" in measures to mitigate a potential threat.27
This means that governments have an obligation to respond to crisis with the
most effective measures warranted by the circumstances, i.e., measures that will
preserve the greatest number of lives and protect the most property. 28 This simple
proposition provides governments with necessary guidance where other wellintentioned policies and principles cannot. Most importantly, it requires prompt
action and not merely proclamations of good will that have little force.
As an example of this phenomenon, the italicized terms in Article 1 of the
hypothetical Planetary Defense Plan, presented below, reflect a number of
concerns voiced by scientific and legal scholars who have addressed the need for
a treaty on asteroid and comet mitigation.29
ARTICLE 1
All of the parties to this treaty shall cooperate to the best of their ability in
measures to deflect or destroy serious asteroid or comet threats.
a) Nations that possess advanced technological capabilities (helpers) shall
provide adequate notice and assistance to other members, especially their
less-developed neighbors, in advance of likely harm, to the degree that
notification or assistance measures do not compromise the helper's national
security,public health, or governance interests.

b) All parties shall participatein the development of precautionary methods to
communicate for, evacuate from, defend against, or otherwise respond to
asteroid or comet threats of a serious magnitude before these threats occur.

Similar to the Outer Space Treaty, which is often criticized for its ambiguity,
the first paragraph of this hypothetical Plan provides no definition for "cooperation.",30 Furthermore, it does not explain how to determine whether a nation has

26. See, e.g., Thomas V. Inglesby et al., A Plague in Your City: Observationsfrom TOPOFF,32 CLINICAL
INFECTIous DisEAsEs 436, 439 (Donald A. Henderson et al. eds., 2001).
27. JOHN VoLER, TiHE GLOBAL COMMONS: ENVIRONMENTAL AND T'IEcHOLOGIcAL GOVERNANCE 155 (2d ed. 2000).
28. Seamone, supranote 22, at 747-48 (discussing exercise of the government's police powers to regulate in
the best interests of a populace).
29. E.g., Liara M. Covert, Before Celestial Bodies Collide-Enhanced Dialogue and Coordination: Precursors to a Treaty for Effective Near Earth Object (NEO) Response, PROC. OF THE INST. OF SPACE L. (Bremen,
Germany) (forthcoming July 2004), at 7 (explaining that agencies should develop a treaty and must "exchange
views on terms like harm, threat, mitigate, rights & protection, and environmental security" for it to be
effective).
30. Critics of space policies and agreements have also recognized, "Definitions are lacking for such terms as
'international regime,' 'common heritage of mankind,' and 'international scientific preserves.' " Eilene
Galloway, The Present Status of the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASPEcTs OF AcrlvmEs IN OUTER SPACE 81, 98 (Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel
ed., 1988).
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cooperated to the "best of [its] ability." And, in mentioning "serious" threats from
asteroids and comets, the paragraph calls for the parties to the treaty to set a
threshold of harm that they all will agree requires mitigation measures.
Subparagraph a) fails to explain what "adequate notice" means or how long
notice can be justifiably withheld. In other words, it is unclear whether "adequate
notice" constitutes a day or a month. Finally, it is unclear to what extent a nation
can relieve itself of the responsibility to assist another nation simply by claiming
any of the three exemptions. Would the mere suggestion of a flood of refugees
from a nearby State permit a nation to refuse providing aid due to its interest in
"internal governance?"
In subparagraph b), it remains unclear how a disaster relief organization in
Calcutta can "participate" in asteroid and comet mitigation programs enacted
between the United States and Japan, for example. The provision also fails to
explain what constitutes effective "communication" or "defensive measures,"
and again leaves the tall order of declaring a threshold for harm sufficient to act.
The hypothetical Planetary Defense Plan may appear to resolve the most
pressing issues facing nations that must respond to the threat of natural impact.
However, it falls short of effectiveness as law. The document is nothing more
than vague legal language, and it is ineffective. By requiring definitions of terms
and thresholds for action, the document embraces the idealistic concept of
unanimous decisions. However, the proposal ignores the reality that no two
scientists share precisely the same definition of any concept, let alone a complex
one related to asteroids and comets. For thirty years, committee members could
go on arguing over the meaning of each and every word in the Plan, without
committing to a single measure that would produce results in the effort to
mitigate asteroid and comet threats. 3 '
In the programs used to mitigate the spread of infectious disease, trans-border
forest fires, nuclear and radiological emergencies, and terrorist attacks, disaster
response agencies have uniformly implemented specific measures that reject the
traditional ineffective approaches to treaty development.3 2 Recognizing that their
policies must address a nearly infinite number of potential disaster scenarios, the
agencies have not obsessed over treaty language.
They have, instead, adopted comprehensive technical guidelines that must be
updated regularly based on input from practical simulation exercises and a
schedule of mandatory reviews. For example, in the legislation authorizing the
TOPOFF exercises,3 3 the United States Congress required state and federal

31. Jirgen Reifarth, An Appropriate Legal Formatfor the Discussion of the Problem of Space Debris, in

ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF Acnvms INOUTER SPACE, supra note 30, at 301, 309 (explaining how prevention
of harm from space cannot be accomplished through the U.N.'s traditional deliberative process and, instead,
requires prompt action).
32. Seamone, supra note 22, at 764-71.
33. Officials named the exercise "TOPOFF" in recognition of the intended participants: "top officials" of
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agency administrators to participate in annual mass disaster simulations with the
goal of improving policies on interagency cooperation.3 4 The Nuclear Energy
Agency has adopted similar guidelines at the international level through its INEX
program.35 To oversee these operations, participating agencies have created
centers that serve as clearinghouses in times of peace and command stations in
responding to widespread disaster.36 While these recent developments in disaster
response provide new insight into the types of mechanisms required to deal with
sudden-onset harm, including natural impact, natural impact requires additional
thought because of its highly-scientific nature. Moreover, the fact that the origin
of harm is nature makes many mitigation approaches designed to handle human
error ineffective in the space context.
As it now stands, no agency has been explicitly designated to take the lead in
planetary defense measures at the international level. In the United States, while
NASA currently has responsibility for tracking Near-Earth Orbiting asteroids
(NEOs), it is not authorized to deploy nuclear devices or evacuate populations. In
other words, the mission of NASA is heavily dependent on research rather than
operational activities. Similarly, no technical guidelines exist to coordinate the
efforts of the multiple agencies that would be forced to respond to asteroid and
comet impacts. At a minimum, the precautionary principle requires that governments institute very rudimentary interventions in protecting the planet. While
effective planetary protection efforts will require the participation of different
nations and their own respective agencies, the precautionary principle calls for a
single center to coordinate activities of different organizations. One example of
such an organization is the Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission,
which coordinates activities of various firefighting organizations in parts of the
United States and Canada by developing regulations and providing necessary
guidance.3 7

Based on existing plans to more effectively prepare for a natural impact,
governments should now agree to disagree on specific measures regarding
thresholds for taking action or definitions of words relating to asteroid and comet
impact defense. Rather than continue the debate, they should instead survey all of

agencies who might otherwise be unprepared to interact with different agencies during a sudden-onset crisis.
Department of Justice, Press Release, Justice Department, State Department to Conduct Exercises Combating
Weapons of Mass Destruction: State and Local Law Enforcement/Emergency Responders From Illinois,
Washington, and Canadato Participate,Oct. 8, 2002, available at, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/October/
02_ag_585.htm, at 1 (describing the involvement of "[t]op federal officials, state governors, mayors, [and] city
managers").
34. S. Rep. No. 105-235, at 14 (1999).
35. Seamone, supra note 22, at 767. "INEX," which stands for "International Nuclear Emergency Exercise,"
describes an international program of simulations coordinated by the Nuclear Energy Agency to prepare nations
for the transboundary effects of nuclear disasters. INEX Introduction, available at http://www.oecdwash.org/
PUBS/ELECTRONIC/inexintro.pdf (last visited, July 27, 2004).
36. Seamone, supra note 22, at 786 fig. 1 (depicting "Unified Command Components").
37. Id. at 768-9 (discussing various aspects of the Commission and its governing regulations).
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the agencies that would have to address an asteroid or comet threat and ask these
same agencies to develop estimates regarding their capabilities and the extent of
their involvement. Each agency should identify points of contact for planetary
defense, its current capabilities, and specific measures that would require interagency collaboration in responding to asteroid and comet threats.
Agency representatives should pool the responses and develop a single,
comprehensive technical manual summarizing the current state of interagency
preparedness. Based on this manual, the representatives should identify common
themes (tentative rules) in planetary defense and any further information that
would be necessary to establish a firm policy on each theme.
As is the case for many national plans, 38 the lead agency responsible for pooling
responses should set a six-month suspense period for developing a draft manual with
the additional requirement of a practical exercise to test key aspects of the plan by the
end of the first year. Participating agencies should now commit, in advance, to make the
guidelines binding after a set number of simulations and revisions.
A. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

This Article recommends that agencies adopt the following actions to bring
their planning into compliance with the mandates of the precautionary principle.
First, because the planning process could go on indefinitely, and effective
preparation to deal with a sudden-onset asteroid or comet crisis requires decisions in advance of the threat's identification, agencies should agree today that all
tentative plans to deflect or destroy asteroids and comets will have a binding
effect on participating agencies within three years, no matter where the developmental process leads in the interim.
Next, because agencies experience great difficulty identifying their own areas
of responsibility in contributing to joint efforts, agencies should, within six
months from today, complete a comprehensive survey of all organizations that
could potentially respond to an asteroid or comet threat. When doing this,
responding organizations should determine their current capabilities, needs, areas
in which they can act independently, and areas in which interagency cooperation
is necessary. They should certainly indicate points of contact and their alternates
during this process.
To determine the accuracy of their projected capabilities and needs, agencies
should, within one year from today, conduct simulations of asteroid and comet
disasters with multiple organizations to test the most complex aspects of the plan
and to determine where it needs revision.
After revising the plan in accordance with noted practical applications of its
major concepts, to produce a meaningful and functional document, agencies
38. See, e.g., Office for Domestic Preparedness Support, White Paper, The Clinton Administration's Policy
on CriticalInfrastructureProtection: PresidentialDecision Directive Sixty-Three, at 5-6 (May 22, 1998).
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should agree to finalize an initial binding version of the plan by the end of
one-year-and-six months. Then, to address future changes, they should agree to
conduct a set number of revisions based on continued reviews and simulations
until they reach the three-year mark, at which time the plan would concretize into
a final version.
By developing policy in this manner, agencies will adopt a grounded approach
that depends on their existing capabilities, 39 rather than on idealistic notions
based solely on good will and appeals to humanity. In effect, this precautionary
approach can be considered a phenomenology of asteroid and comet impact
mitigation. 40 Most importantly, the process complies with the doctrine of effectiveness as law.
III.

HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL

DIRECTIVEJHSPD-5

Although there is not currently a national plan regulating the United States
government's defense against asteroid and comet impacts, recent developments
from within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provide a very basic
operational framework that will overlap with responses to any natural impact
threat until agencies develop a more detailed threat-specific plan. While these
provisions do not directly address natural impact, they require a series of steps
that agencies must use when responding to natural impact threats. In this sense,
the regulations are more successful than any others to date in addressing many
aspects of natural impact.
In light of serious indications that America is unprepared for no-notice harm,
including the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the spread of Sudden
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 4 1 President Bush, in the Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 (HSPD-5), directed the DHS to develop a
comprehensive plan on how the nation would react to a threat of serious
magnitude."2 He required the DHS to develop a National Response Plan with the
sole purpose of coordinating the responses of federal, state, and local entities in
the event of a widespread disaster: "[t]o prevent, prepare for, respond to, and
recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, the United
States Government shall
establish a single comprehensive approach to domestic
43
incident management."
39. See BARNEY G. GLASSER & ANSELM L. STRAUSS, THE DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED THEORY: STRATEGIES FOR
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1967) (describing an inductive and iterative method for researching issues that
achieves much more than a traditional deductive process).
40. See generally DON IHDE, EXPERIMENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION (1977) (explaining the
nature of that discipline, which requires the suspension of pre-formulated hypotheses that are not based on
intensive observation).
41. Also consider the widespread blackouts of 2003, which occurred during the initial phases of this effort.
42. Press Release, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, (Feb. 28,. 2003) available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html.
43. Id.at para. 3.
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The HSPD-5 and its required National Response Plan both have significance for all agencies that will eventually respond to a natural impact
disaster. These doctrines make it DHS's responsibility to become involved
in responses to widespread harm and they require agencies to follow certain guidelines when mounting defensive measures. Although the National Response Plan is still in development and there is currently no
agency tasked with the responsibility of defending the earth against natural
impact threats, the directives provide a coordinating structure, a framework
for interagency decision-making, and a method to disseminate warnings
quickly.
Paragraph four of HSPD-5 explains that DHS will be the lead agency for
disasters in any one of four situations. Three of these scenarios could
potentially extend to natural impact if a federal agency or state asks for help
or the President orders the Secretary of Homeland Security to assume
responsibility. However, Subparagraph (3) requires DHS's involvement when
"more than one Federal department or agency has become substantially
involved in responding to the incident. ' '4 4 Natural impact falls within this
third provision mainly because of the lack of a coordinating structure to deal
with the threat. Any real natural impact scenario would require a simultaneous response by at least NASA, the military, federal public health agencies,
and federal disaster response organizations.4 5
HSPD-5 and the National Response Plan oblige agencies to cooperate with
DHS in developing the National Response Plan with respect to their unique
disaster response functions.46 Agencies achieve this goal by updating their
own planning documents to reflect new changes imposed by the Plan.
Agencies also cooperate by reporting the development of any plan to
"prevent, respond to, or recover from an incident for which a department or
agency has responsibility under law or directive under the criteria established
in HSPD-5. ' 4 7

The consequence of this requirement to notify DHS of plans to mitigate serious
threats makes it inevitable that DHS will be involved in any planetary defense
plan. While it is still questionable when or to what extent the involvement will
occur, agencies partnering with DHS in efforts to mitigate natural impact have
much to gain. The applicable regulations provide a coordinating framework by
making DHS responsible for the following interventions.

44. Id. at para4.
45. See, e.g., Michael Gerrard & John L. Remo, Response to Sub-Critical Cosmic Impacts, 52 J. BRIT.
INTERPLANETARY SOC'Y 115, 118-20 (1999) (recognizing that numerous organizations would be required to
institute response measures to mitigate the threat of a real natural impact).
46. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, INITIAL NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN (Sept. 30,2003), available
at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/InitialNRP_100903.pdf [hereinafter INITIAL PLAN].
47. Id. at § V.A.4.a at 8.
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APPLICABLE SOLUTIONS FOR PLANETARY DEFENSE

The new provisions in the National Response Plan enable planetary defense
because they incorporate all serious threats into a single plan. A major benefit of
the National Response Plan is its objective to "integrate the current family of
federal domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into a
single all-discipline, all-hazards plan.,,48 By consolidating standards in multiple
areas, the Plan permits agencies to distill themes that apply to them collectively.
New considerations and lessons learned in other contexts can easily motivate
disaster-specific mitigation measures. The final version of the Plan will inevitably
answer many of the most pressing questions facing agencies involved in
planetary defense.
The provisions also provide for an operations center, which will benefit
planetary defense by providing the ability to launch programs around-the-clock
as soon as a threat is identified. Recognizing the need for effective oversight
during emergencies, as well as the dissemination of coordinating information at
all times, DHS has instituted the National Homeland Security Operations Center
(HSOC). The Center operates at all times, assessing incidents throughout the
nation, issuing warnings and advisory bulletins, and supplementing preparedness
efforts in concert with state and federal agencies. 4 9 At the HSOC, representatives
from multiple agencies are on hand to "integrate a full spectrum of interagency
subject matter expertise and reach-back capacity. ' 50 At present, without such a
framework specifically addressing natural impact response, the HSOC provides a
ready alternative. However, due to the unique nature of the natural impact threat,
it would be far more effective to develop an analogous organization specifically
tailored to natural impact, which would coordinate with the HSOC in the event of
a confirmed threat. 5 1 For example, it is unclear whether the warning system
developed by the HSOC comports with warning scales intended for natural
impact. Harmonization of the different scales will be crucial for disseminating
effective warnings to the public.
Provisions regarding interagency cooperation also strengthen the ability to
develop far-reaching natural impact prevention strategies from an interdisciplinary standpoint. A staple of the National Response Plan is the Interagency
Incident Management Group (11MG). This is a panel of senior representatives
from key agencies that can be convened at short notice to reach a consensus on
measures to mitigate a potential or confirmed threat.52 The IIMG will confirm the
existence of the threat, prioritize responsive measures, and anticipate resources

48. Id. at § I.C, at I.
49. Id. at § .A.Ia-e at 3.
50. Id. at § IV.A.4 at 3.
51. Seamone, supra note 22, at 786, fig. 1.
52. INITIAL PLAN, supra note 46, at § IV.B.2 at 4.
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required to promptly recover from a serious incident.53 Subsequent to a decision
by the IIMG, ranking members of the Homeland Security Council and Presidential assistants will develop a course of action based on the Council's findings. 54
Such coordination will permit agencies to adapt to the nuances of a situation
rather than forcing them to abide by an inflexible set of guidelines that is
supposed to solve every problem. Decision-making fostered by the IIMG would
address natural impact scenarios far better than a treaty-based approach alone.
For those concerned that no one has the responsibility to take the lead in
responding to asteroid or comet threats, the new regulations provide guidance
applicable to natural impact. In an effort to develop a clear chain of command, the

National Response Plan provides for a Principal Federal Officer (PFO) to direct
interagency efforts as a national spokesperson based on the nature of a specific
threat. Among other duties, this individual will "serve as a primary, although not
exclusive, point for Federal interface with State, local, and tribal government
officials, the media, and the private sector for the incident management., 55 As a
fallback plan, this mechanism will designate a lead agency and individual
responsible for responding to natural impact if these entities are not selected by
other means prior to a serious incident involving comets or asteroids.
Finally, the new provisions require methods to predict and respond to the
unknown aspects of natural impact threats. In relation to the National Response
Plan and HSPD-5, HSPD-8 directs that all agencies with responsibility for
national disaster response will participate in disaster simulations to enhance their
response capacities. 56 HSPD-8 provides for a "master exercise calendar" specifically to "establish a national program and a multi-year planning system to
conduct homeland security preparedness-related exercises that reinforces identified training standards, provides for evaluation of readiness, and supports the
national preparedness goal." 57 Each agency is required to evaluate its own needs
in relation to these objectives, so the lessons learned can be shared and
implemented across programs. 5 8 Any agency remotely involved in space activities should incorporate natural impact scenarios into its requests for time on the
master exercise calendar.
B.

QUESTIONS THAT REMAIN UNANSWERED IN THE NEW POLICIES

Measures at the Department of Homeland Security are still developing,

which leaves ample room for inclusion of natural impact mitigation. How-

53. Id. at § IV.B.2a-g at 4-5.
54. Id. at § IV.C.I at 5.
55. Id. at § IV.D.Id at 6.
56. HSPD-8 requires a "comprehensive training program." Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8,
para. (17) (Dec. 17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html.
57. Id. at para. 18.
58. Id. at paras. 19-20.
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ever, it is questionable if or when the Plan will directly address planetary
defense.
On the one hand, much of the National Response Plan depends on pre-existing
policies and agency frameworks. Since there are none for planetary defense, there
may be less impetus to define specific responsibilities. On the other hand, NASA
has not even been designated among the many agencies involved in staffing the
HSOC 59 and serving on the IIMG. 60 Given the lingering issues posed by Skylab,
the Mir station, Cosmos 954, the Columbia shuttle explosion, and the problem of
space debris, one would expect space disasters to take a greater level of priority at
the Department of Homeland Security. As long as these issues are ignored, it is
unlikely that natural impact will rocket to the forefront without significant
political pressure.
The major benefit of the National Response Plan is overlap in the development
of measures that apply directly to planetary defense. Working groups from
different agencies are now identifying the most difficult problems plaguing
international and interagency cooperation and answers are just a phone call or
short visit away. In the advent of these developments, agencies involved in planetary
defense now have the tools necessary to meet the requirements of the precautionary
principle. Governments must begin to investigate existing alternatives for mounting prompt action to defend the planet against asteroid and comet collisions.
IV.

GOVERNMENT LIABILITY

Consider the massive legal battle that will ensue if a huge asteroid strikes a
country without any warning or the case where measures to deflect or destroy an
asteroid fail and cause damage. Government liability associated with this type of
harm depends on a number of factors. In most jurisdictions, private individuals
are not liable for the harm they cause when rescuing people in distress unless
rescuers act in a manner that is grossly negligent, reckless, or intentional. 6 1 The
policy behind the protection afforded rescuers is to encourage heroic acts without
the threat of a lawsuit. In states like Vermont, which has recognized a duty to
rescue, this immunity is part of the law. 6 2 In all U.S. jurisdictions, first responders
like doctors, nurses, and emergency technicians, are given similar protections for
their acts of rescue when responding to disasters or emergencies.6 3 These
provisions are not very different from the immunities granted by disaster treaties

59. INITIAL PLAN, supra note 46, at 10 app. A.

60. Id. at I Iapp. B.
61. WILLIAM PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 196 (5th ed. 1984) ("The courts have
been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held to the standard
of conduct normally applied to one who is in no such situation.").
62. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973 & Supp. 1994).

63. Eric A. Brandt, Comment, Good SamaritanLaws - The Legal Placebo:A CurrentAnalysis, 17 AKRON L.
REV.303 (1983).
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addressing mutual aid. In the international convention addressing nuclear and
radiological disasters, Article 10(2) makes it clear that countries that render aid to
others who face harm will not be liable for death, harm to property,
or
64
environmental damage during rescue efforts unless the harm is willful.
A.

UNINTENDED DEFLECTION ONTO ANOTHER COUNTRY

Following the precedent set by the nuclear and radiological assistance convention, if a planetary protector attempts to deflect an asteroid and inadvertently
harms another country by changing the course of the object or firing a projectile
at it, the protector would not be held liable. International agreements should
contain such language encouraging prompt action to defend against threats.
However, an exception occurs if a defender intentionally alters the course of the
object into the territory of another nation to protect its own interests. To avoid that
scenario, the provision should be coupled with warning requirements similar to
the nuclear and radiological assistance convention addressed above.
B.

INADEQUATE PROTECTIVE MEASURES

There is a difference between mounting a calculated defense and launching
hasty defensive measures in a panic. Prior plans, simulations, and other testing
must characterize the nature of a protective measure. If the planetary defender
institutes a measure negligently in a gamble that it will be effective without any
prior testing and evaluation, this behavior can be considered reckless, removing
the immunity that would otherwise attach. In the early case of United States v.
Lawter,65 a federal court grappled with a situation where an inexperienced
crewmember of a United States Coast Guard rescue helicopter killed a shipwrecked woman by dropping her from a hoist that he had never used before.6 6
While, normally, the government would not be held liable for such actions, in this
case, the guardsman's gross negligence provided a basis for increased monetary
relief. Similarly, in the case of Indian Towing v. United States,6 7 the Supreme
Court explained that government agencies must skillfully complete tasks they
have undertaken.68 At issue in that case was a lighthouse operated by the Coast
Guard, which lost its signal in bad weather and failed to properly direct a tugboat
at sea.
64. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Sept. 26, 1986, reprinted in 25 I.L.M 1369
(1986); Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Sept. 26, 1986,
reprintedin id. at 1377.
65. 219 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955).
66. Id. at 560 n. 1 (Findings of Fact).
67. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
68. Id. at 69 ("The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once it exercised its discretion
to operate a light on Chandeleur Island and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it was
obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in good working order.").
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Cases such as Lawter and Indian Towing illustrate circumstances when
government agencies, in adopting protective measures for members of the public,
develop "special relationships" that require them to exercise care. While governments may not be required to provide adequate safety services in all cases,6 9 they
must do so in situations where they act: "(1) by way of a positive act that inhibits
selfhelp or private rescue; (2) by way of a state's positive act that exposes the
plaintiff to danger; and (3) by way of an undertaking that worsens the plaintiff's
position. 7 ° When governments take action to respond to asteroids or comets,
given the lack of alternative plans citizens can adopt to protect themselves, these
plans must be executed with some level of skill. In the context of planetary
defense, simulations will help develop standard operating procedures that can be
applied in a real situation, reinforcing the mandate of the precautionary principle
to engage in planning in advance of the harm.
C. GOVERNMENTAL INACTION

If the government takes no action to protect against an asteroid threat that
could be reasonably anticipated, it is likely that liability will attach. In Ducey
v. United States,7 1 survivors of a victim that died in a flash flood at a
recreational park sued the government for failing to warn of the flood, as well
as failing to rescue. The evidence showed that the government officials
responsible for ensuring safety at the park were aware that floods generally
occurred every hundred years. After that time, they failed to institute
measures to prepare for the possibility. Even though the government argued
that it could never anticipate the precise timing of a flash flood, the plaintiffs
prevailed because the government was in a very unique position to track
floods and develop measures that average citizens would never be capable of
doing themselves.72 Most importantly, the court rejected the idea that the
government could not be liable since the flood was an "act of God" many
times greater than anyone could have predicted.7 3
By holding that the government had a duty to anticipate natural harm and
institute precautionary measures, the Ducey court suggested that governments

must take action to prepare for and mitigate asteroid and comet threats. Unlike
the flash flood scenario addressed in Ducey, the few documented cases of earth

impacts suggest that a somewhat serious asteroid or comet strike with the

69. Cf, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (explaining
constitutional ramifications: "[T]he Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to government
aid, even when such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests...").
70. Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a ConstitutionalTort: Deshaney and Its

Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REV. 107, 147 (1991).
71. Ducey v. U.S., 830 F.2d 1071 (9th Cit. 1987).
72. Id. at 1072.
73. Id.
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potential to kill at least hundreds of people occurs even more frequently than
74
every 100 years.
V. LESSONS FROM PUBLIC HEALTH
In the area of planetary defense, there are currently more questions than
answers available for framing the optimal policy approach.7 5 It is tempting to
categorize natural impact as an issue of "outer space policy," or "environmental
policy," simply to make it easier for an agency to borrow decision frameworks
from existing programs. But effective policy does not develop in this manner.
To a degree, the problem of natural impact shares common themes with the
problem of infectious disease. Much like asteroid and comet threats, infectious
diseases can spread with little or no advance warning.7 6 Additionally, disease
threats are similar to asteroid threats in the sense that their emergence is certain
even though scientists cannot pinpoint exactly when: "[a]lthough we do not know
where the next microbe or virus will appear ... we know new outbreaks are
certain. 7 7 Just as some space agencies have been content to suggest that they
have identified a large percentage of asteroid threats simply by virtue of
cataloguing known NEO asteroids, doctors have made similar errors in the field
of infectious disease. On December 4, 1967, for example, the U.S. Surgeon
General, Dr. William H. Stewart "informed a meeting of state and territorial
health officials that infectious diseases were now conquered." 7 8 Of many lessons
in the health policy area, the most important is that effective regulation of
contagion requires the ability to design flexible policies that do not confine issues
to any single category.
A. THE PROBLEM OF LABELING

The problem of labels has stifled the development of law and policy
regarding infectious disease. In many states, laws previously addressed
diseases piecemeal, based on specific characteristics of certain diseases while
excluding others. Over the years, these laws became antiquated and inflexible. 79 As new strains of disease emerged, states were faced with outdated

74. Seamone, supra note 22, at 752 n.82.
75. Cf. Worden, supra note 4 (raising unanswered questions).
76. ARNO KARLEN, MAN AND MICROBES: DISEASE AND PLAGUES IN HISTORY AND MODERN TIMES 2 (1995)

("For each new disease known to the general public, there are a dozen others; the wheels of biological change
keep turning faster.").
77. Id. at 4 (citing Epidemiologist Robert Shope).
78. FRANK RYAN, VIRUS XL TRACKING THE NEW KILLER PLAGUES: OUT OF THE PRESENT AND INTO THE FUTURE

6(1997).
79. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study of Infectious Disease Law in the
United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 109-10 (1999) (criticizing "outdated," "pigeonhole classifications" in the
regulation of infectious disease).
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laws that did not sufficiently address the most pressing symptoms of modem
ailments.8 °
Scholars characterized the problem as one of categorization. 8 1 They
realized that public health issues were ambiguous to the point where they
could be defined broadly enough to encompass several disciplines or nar82
rowly enough to exclude all but one specialty within a single discipline.
Medical scholars have realized the solution to this problem requires employing a different mindset. Rather than focusing on the source of an infection
(e.g., symptoms of specific diseases), policymakers must instead address the
unwanted effects of these diseases that are common to all people regardless of
the disease's name. 8 3
In developing planetary defense measures, policymakers can learn a lesson
from medicine by considering aspects of the harm threatened by asteroid and
comet impacts and not only the fact that the threat involves space.8 4 Space
policy is only one consideration when mitigating the threat of natural impact.
The Outer Space Treaty and existing space doctrines are not the only or ideal
documents governing interagency responses to this harm.8 5 These should be
read only in concert with other disaster conventions and agreements, like the
nuclear and radiological convention, which contain detailed technical guid86
ance.

80. Id.
81. At the international level, critics of the International Health Regulations describe a similar limitation on
the methods available to address exotic strains of infectious disease because the initial rules applied only to the
narrow categories of plague, yellow fever, and cholera. David P. Fidler, Emerging Trends in InternationalLaw
Concerning Global Infectious Disease Control, 9 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 285, 286 (2003). The World
Health Organization has begun to remedy this problem by focusing on common characteristics of all diseases
not just the characteristics of certain types. World Health Organization, The Revisions of the International
Health Regulations, 71 WKLY. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL REC. 233 (1996).
82. For example, "public health" has taken on such a broad meaning, it encompasses "communicable disease
control, food and water quality protection, environmental and occupational risk reduction... [,] highway safety
... [,] modification of chronic disease risks linked to behavior," and any event that impacts these areas of
concern. Gostin et al., supra note 79, at 91; see also Obijiofor Aginam, InternationalLaw and Communicable
Diseases, 80 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 946,947 (2002): ("Multilateral governance of communicable diseases
implicates other sub-categories of international law: international human rights law; humanitarian laws and
laws of war; international environmental law; law of the sea and international maritime law; intellectual
property law; and bioethics.").
83. Seamone, supra note 22, at 774-79 (describing the "source-effects" imbalance that characterizes policies
regarding space).
84. Id.
85. Outer Space law is currently at the developmental stage, providing little guidance and too many
uncertainties. See Reifarth, supra note 31, at 301, 302; John L. Remo, Policy Perspectives from the UN
InternationalConferenceon Near Earth Objects, 12 SPACE POL'Y 13, app. at 17 (1999) ("International law and
practice does not address this issue directly."); U.K. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 33 ("There are no
obvious precedents...").
86. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Sept. 26, 1986, reprinted in 25 I.L.M 1369
(1986); Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Sept. 26, 1986,
reprintedin id. at 1377.

2004]

PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN PLANETARY DEFENSE

B. AGENCY OVER-INVOLVEMENT

Anytime the potential for serious, widespread harm is realized, more agencies

will broadly interpret their charters to include the new harm. These agencies will
regulate governmental behavior even if they had never before considered the
threat. One example in infectious disease mitigation was the sudden involvement
of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) into the law and
policy forums addressing the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) when the
virus became more widespread in the 1980s.

In 1987, OSHA "catapulted" itself into the domain of HIV by claiming that its
statutory obligation to regulate hazards in the workplace included communicable
disease.

7

Since then, the permanent standards developed by the Agency have

complicated duties owed to the public and created inconsistencies in regulatory
standards, which some criticize for being ad hoc.8 8 While this additional
involvement in the federal regulation of contagion has helped to develop new
standards, it is also true that the accompanying requirements for perfunctory "risk
assessments, feasibility studies, workplace surveys, regulatory and impact analyses, and cost benefit calculations" have limited the ability of the agency to
respond quickly to a constantly changing social landscape.8 9 The resulting
problem for other agencies mitigating infectious disease is a new set of precedents to consider, which dilute the federal government's ability to take coordinated and prompt action.
This phenomenon of increasing involvement has many dimensions. Similar to
the OSHA experience, at the international level, the World Health Organization
(WHO) petitioned the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1996 and cited its
own Constitution as grounds to attack the legal basis for the use of nuclear
weapons by countries in armed conflict. 90 The WHO claimed that "harmful
health and environmental effects" of such weapons were within their area of
responsibility, causing the Court to determine the scope of the WHO's obligations. 9 ' Although the ICJ held that the WHO had no standing to raise this
question, it reached this decision on the basis that the WHO's responsibility did
not extend to determining the lawfulness of governmental actions. The Court
declined to address the merits of the complaint because the WHO couched the
issue in terms of law rather than specific practices. However, the ICJ still

87. Paula E. Berg, When the Hazard is Human: Irrationality,Inequity, and Unintended Consequences in
FederalRegulationof Contagion, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1367, 1368 (1997).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1377.
90. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 66 (July 8),
reprintedin 35 I.L.M. 809 (1996).
91. The specific question posed by the WHO was: "In view of the health and environmental effects, would
the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under
international law including the WHO constitution?" Id.
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recognized that the WHO had the responsibility to involve itself in preventive
measures and policies involving activities that are hazardous to the world
community. 92 The actions of the WHO foreshadow future attempts by numerous
organizations to stake their own claims in planetary defense.
Natural impact threats raise a crucial point involving cooperation within and among
different nations-unrestrained cooperation and interdisciplinary involvement can
produce chaos rather than effectiveness.9 3 On a continuum from short-notice threats to
long-term ones, as the magnitude of a natural impact threat increases or the response
time grows shorter, more agencies will petition for involvement in the decision-making
process. While space and military agencies might dominate the initial stages of
decision-making, law enforcement, health, environmental, and fiscal agencies will
merge into the decision-making framework over time.
The influx of agency involvement can, of course, offer alternative perspectives. However, disruption, dilution, or ignorance of established frameworks will,
no doubt, limit the overall effectiveness of joint efforts. The solution to this
problem of coordination is not necessarily to give the lead to one agency and then
prevent other agencies from meaningful modification of existing standards; nor is
the answer carving out limited areas in which different agencies should legislate.
Instead, the answer is to draw on the experience of all the agencies that could
potentially become involved, identify their needs, exchange views, and then
incorporate joint considerations into a single set of coordinating instructions. The
National Response Plan incorporates many of these lessons.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The precautionary principle is a legal concept that deals with uncertainty.
Natural impact threats are creatures of uncertainty. Even though the principle is
silent regarding specific measures to mitigate natural impact, the principle tells
nations how they should approach this threat. Under this grounded approach to
planetary defense, agencies must understand their capabilities before committing
to policy objectives. Ultimately, insights developed as the result of a processoriented approach will be optimal because they will lead to clear and unambiguous policies. Furthermore, they will withstand the test of exigency, and, in so
doing, maximize life and minimize collateral damage.
Planetary defense has emerged at an ideal time when agencies responsible for
threat mitigation are reevaluating their capabilities and needs. Limiting this issue
to the domain of "space" or the "environment" will defeat planetary defense.
Planetary defense touches many different disciplines and cannot be dealt with
properly by NASA or the Department of Defense alone. To understand exactly
who is vested with specific responsibilities, agencies must turn to machinery that
92. Id. (especially Judge Weeramantry's dissenting opinion).
93. Inglesby et al., supra note 26, at 439.
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has begun to resolve broader issues, such as the National Response Plan. They
must also conduct independent investigations into the issue of natural impact
since many response measures must be threat-specific.
For future development of natural impact policy, agencies must first develop a
single Planetary Defense Plan that addresses each of their specific responsibilities
in planetary defense. The Plan must also identify mitigation measures requiring
the collaboration of multiple agencies. All agencies involved in the development
of this Plan should identify their objectives when responding to natural impact
threats and corresponding measures thought to satisfy those objectives. And, an
organization responsible for coordinating planetary defense standards should
assist agencies in implementing the Planetary Defense Plan.
Today, while agencies still lack a framework to deal specifically with natural impact,
they should follow the above guidance. Before taking action, agencies must reject the
notion that no one is officially accountable for responding to the threat of asteroid or
comet collisions. The responsibility is shared between different agencies at each stage
during which the threat manifests. When an organization spots an asteroid or comet
threat, it should request the assistance of the Department of Homeland Security upon
confirming that the threat is genuine. On the basis of HSPD-5, it should work in concert
with DHS to develop a joint response.
In mounting this response, agencies should take various actions to ensure that
they implement the most effective mitigation measures. Well before implementation of defensive measures, agencies should harmonize existing warning scales to
guarantee interagency communication and communication with the public. They
should also conduct simulations and training exercises for all of the defensive
methods within contemplation. These precautions will avoid judgments that
agencies were reckless in the deployment of technology. Such attempts to test the
validity of operational plans before deploying strategic assets will also demonstrate due care on the part of governments, enabling them to reap the benefits of
Good Samaritan Immunity and explore the full spectrum of options to destroy or
deflect an oncoming asteroid or comet. Although many operational requirements
are limited to the National Response Plan, they are still significant at the
international level because most of the stated objectives can be accomplished
only through international cooperation.94
Until governments develop a Planetary Defense Plan that conforms to the requirements discussed above, the earth's biggest threat is not simply the possibility of natural
impact; it is a lack of urgency in taking preventive action against natural impact while
95
uniquely positioned agencies are still capable of doing So.

94. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, State Department to Conduct Exercises Combating Weapons
of Mass Destruction: State and Local Law Enforcement Emergency Responders From Illinois, Washington, and
Canada to Participate (Oct. 8, 2002), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/October/O2_ag-585.htm,
at 2 (comments of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and statement of objectives for the international exercise).
95. HYMAN, supra note 15, at 43.
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